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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION RIGHTS
By 1905 the South Carolina Supreme Court had recognized
the common law rule that the child's welfare is the paramount
consideration in determining custody of a child.1 At an earlier
time under the common law, 'the natural father had the primary
right to the child's custody.2 Because the law imposed upon the
father the responsibility of education and support, courts had
reasoned that his claim was superior to that of the mother.3 Stat-
utes have eliminated all preferences between parents,' and the
welfare of the child remains the controlling factor in custody pro-
ceedings. During the past term, the supreme court heard custody
disputes arising in various contexts-between parents, between a
parent and grandparents, and between a parent and a third
party.
A. Disputes Between Parents
In Peay v. Peay,6 the court awarded the custody of a five year
old child to his father. The record clearly showed that both of the
parties contributed to the marital disruption, 7 but neither was
1. Ex parte Davidge, 72 S.C. 16, 18, 51 S.E. 269, 270 (1905).
2. Ex parte Rembert, 82 S.C. 336, 340, 64 S.E. 150, 151 (1909); but see Ex parte
Tillman, 84 S.C. 552, 561, 66 S.E. 1049, 1054 (1910), where the court states: "[W]hen
the father relinquishes his right to the custody or forfeits it by his conduct, there can be
no doubt that the mother. . . is entitled to the care and custody of her children."
3. Ex parte Davidge, 72 S.C. 16, 18, 51 S.E. 269, 269 (1905).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-51 (1962) provides:
The wife and husband are the joint natural guardians of their minor children
and are equally charged with their welfare and education and the care and
management of their estates and the wife and husband shall have equal power,
right and duties and neither parent has any right paramount to the right of the
other concerning the custody of the minor or the control of the services or the
earnings of such minor or any other matter affecting the minor. Neither parent
shall forcibly take a child from the guardianship of the parent legally entitled
to its custody. The welfare of the minor shall be the first consideration and the
court having jurisdiction shall determine all questions concerning the guardian-
ship of the minor. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to relieve the
father of his common-law obligation to support his children, nor shall it be
construed to increase the liability of the mother to support the children.
5. See Powell v. Powell, 256 S.C. 111, 181 S.E.2d 13 (1971); Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C.
344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963); Koon v. Koon, 203 S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89 (1944).
6. 260 S.C. 108, 194 S.E.2d 392 (1973).
7. Record at 6 and 44.
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adjudged an unfit parent.8 The lower court emphasized the find-
ing that the wife had had an affair two years prior to the couple's
separation. Although the wife denied that the affair caused the
"separation,9 the court accepted the husband's contention that she
left him because of "her desire for someone else."10 The evidence
indicating the nature of the subsequent relationships was con-
flicting. The husband complained of another man's presence in
the apartment of his wife, but the wife denied any improper con-
duct. Apparently relying upon the husband's testimony, the trial
court ruled that "it would be advisable for the [wife] not to have
the child with someone else in the apartment.""
After reviewing the entire record, the supreme court affirmed
the lower court's decision, finding no error in the "conclusion that
the evidence preponderates in favor of the father."' 2 Deference to
the trial court in custody proceedings was justified by the court
on the ground that it is the trial judge who actually sees and hears
the witnesses and must retain jurisdiction over the case should
subsequent conflicts arise. 3 However, as noted in Justice Bus-
sey's dissent, such deference in Peay was disturbing because the
order of the trial judge "failed[ed] to show upon which asserted
facts the ultimate conclusion of the court [was] based."" The
trial court's order did not address the potential physical sur-
roundings of the child, the tender years doctrine, or the relative
suitability of the parents.1" However, the majority, although rec-
ognizing that "the order. . . might have been more full,"' 6 found
that it met the minimal compliance.
1 7
The supreme court also heard cases in which the petitioners
sought a change of custody. In South Carolina, it is well estab-
lished that a judicial award of the custody of a child is never
final. 8 Custody orders included in divorce decrees are usually
8. 260 S.C. at 113, 194 S.E.2d at 394 (Bussey, J., dissenting).
9. Record at 69.
10. Record at 78-79.
11. Record at 78.
12. 260 S.C. at 111, 194 S.E.2d at 393.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 113, 194 S.E.2d at 394.
15. Brief for Appellant at 12.
16. 260 S.C. at 112, 194 S.E.2d at 394.
17. Id. FArM. CT. R. 13 states: "The orders and decrees of the court shall set forth the
salient facts upon which the order is granted."
18. Moore v. Moore, 235 S.C. 386, 111 S.E.2d 695 (1959); Douglass v. Merriman, 163
S.C. 210, 161 S.E.2d 452 (1931).
1974]
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modifiable by the court issuing the original decree as well as by
other courts of competent jurisdiction. 9 To obtain a change of
custody in South Carolina, the party seeking the modification
must show the existence of new facts and circumstances which
substantially affect the interest and welfare of the child.2"
In Barrett v. Barrett,2' the court considered the degree of
change in condition sufficient to warrant a change in custody. In
accordance with his visitation rights, the father of three minor
children travelled to Ohio and brought them back to Greenville
with him for the summer. Upon his return, he instituted a
proceeding for a change of custody, alleging that the remarriage
of the mother constituted a sufficient change of circumstances.
The court found no evidence in the record to show that the remar-
riage would be detrimental to the children's best interests and
thus reversed the trial court's modification of custody. The court
noted that remarriage generally is not a change of condition
which is adverse in character; rather it has often provided a basis
for obtaining custody.
22
Similarly, in Smith v. Smith,23 the father instituted a pro-
ceeding alleging that the wife's remarriage constituted a change
19. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 17.7 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
H. CLARKI.
20. Pullen v. Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 128, 169 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1969). South Carolina
seemingly follows the more restricted view in allowing modification only upon proof of a
change in circumstances occurring subsequent to the original decree. H. CLARK, supra note
19; see also Mixson v. Mixson, 253 S.C. 436, 171 S.E.2d 581 (1969); Ex parte Atkinson,
238 S.C. 521, 121 S.E.2d 4 (1961); Annot., 9 A.L.R. 623 (1950). It has been suggested that
jurisdictions which follow the more restricted view recognize the societal interest in pro-
mooting the finality of judgments. On the other hand, a large number of jurisdictions have
adopted the view that the interests of the child override the principles of res judicata. In
these jurisdictions, not only changes in conditions following the first decree but also facts
existing at thetime of the earlier decree which were not presented to the court issuing the
decree may be used as grounds for modifying custody arrangements. H. CLARK, supra note
19.
21. 261 S.C. 111, 198 S.E.2d 532 (1973).
22. Id. at 115, 198 S.E.2d at 534, quoting Moorhead v. Scott, 259 S.C. 580, 585, 193
S.E.2d 510, 513 (1972). Although the Barrett decision may be explained on the basis of
the court's strict adherence to the requirements which constitute a change in circumstan-
ces, the opinion is susceptible to further interpretation. It is certainly possible that the
supreme court is demonstrating that it does not plan to become a forum favorable to
parents who, after obtaining temporary custody of their children, return to the state and
somewhat surreptitiously institute a proceeding for a change in custody. Although the
father had legitimately obtained temporary custody of the children, they were to be
returned to the mother at the close of the summer vacation. It was only upon the mother's
arrival in South Carolina at the end of the summer that she learned of the new custody
proceeding. Id. at 144, 198 S.E.2d at 533.
23. 261 S.C. 81, 198 S.E.2d 271 (1973).
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of circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of custody.
The supreme court, in reversing the lower court's decision to mo-
dify the custody, noted that no finding had been made that the
child would not receive reasonable and proper care if custody
remained with the mother and her new husband. The trial court
was influenced by the fact that the mother removed the child
from the state without the knowledge or permission of the court
or the father. The supreme court pointed out, however, that the
original decree granting custody to the mother placed no restric-
tions upon where she and the child were to live. The mother's
leaving the state to live with relatives was not considered a
material change in condition which warranted change in custody.
Furthermore, even assuming that this action did violate the cus-
todial decree by depriving the father of visitation rights, it would
not necessarily require a change in custody. An award or change
of custody, the court cautioned, may not be used to punish a
parent for acting in violation of an order of the court.24
The lower court also emphasized the express desire of the
child to reside with the father. Recognizing that the wishes of the
child are a valid consideration, the Smith court pointed out that
the significance of a child's preferences depends upon the age of
the child and the circumstances involved.21 The common sense
rule concerning the significance to be attached to the preference
of the child was developed in great detail in an early supreme
court decision. 2 A child's desires are considered not because he
has a legal right to be placed in the custody of the parent of his
choice but instead to enable the court to exercise its discretion
more wisely. In a recent decision, the court noted that "the wishes
of a child of any age may be considered. . . , but that the weight
given to those wishes must be dominated by what is best for the
welfare of the [child] ."27 The court, in most instances, is willing
to follow the preference of a child in his teens but places little
reliance on the desires of younger children.2 In Smith, the court
did not find the wishes of the seven year old child extremely
persuasive because the record strongly indicated that his
24. Id. at 83-84, 198 S.E.2d at 273-74.
25. Id. at 85, 198 S.E.2d at 274.
26. Ex parte Reynolds, 73 S.C. 580, 53 S.E. 490 (1906).
27. Moorhead v. Scott, 259 S.C. 580, 585, 193 S.E.2d 510, 513 (1972).
28. Guinan v. Guinan, 254 S.C. 554, 176 S.E.2d 172 (1970); Poliakoffv. Poliakoff, 221
S.C. 391, 70 S.E.2d 625 (1952); Workman v. Watts, 74 S.C. 546, 54 S.E. 775 (1906); Ex
parte Reynolds, 73 S.C. 296, 53 S.E. 490 (1906).
1974]
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preference was influenced by the permissive attitude of his
father."9
B. Disputes Between Parents and Grandparents
In Welchel v. Boyter,30 the issue before the court was whether
the stepfather could be held in contempt of a prior order of the
court. In response to continuous harassment by the grandparents,
the child's parents had commenced an action in the county court
seeking an injunction. Finding that the grandparents had unrea-
sonably harrassed the parents, the trial judge granted the relief
sought, but stipulated that the child be permitted to speak with
the grandparents on the telephone at specified times.3 ' The
grandparents subsequently brought a proceeding for contempt,
alleging that the stepfather "had been uncooperative in carrying
out the order of the court" 32 and had further discouraged the child
from communicating with the grandparents. The trial judge
found the stepfather in contempt of court and sentenced him to
confinement for fifteen days, unless he "purge[d] himself" by
permitting the child to have lunch with the grandparents on two
successive Saturdays.3 3 Without reviewing the evidence, the su-
preme court reversed the lower court's decision, pointing out that
the trial judge's findings failed to establish the stepfather's diso-
bedience of the court order. Emphasizing that the prior order had
29. The court relied upon the report of the probation officer of the Family Court
which recommended that the father receive custody, but also stated:
Robbie expressed a desire to stay with his father, but to be allowed visitation
with his mother. He pointed out few negatives as far as living with his mother
and his motives for wanting to stay with his father are questionable as pointed
out by Linda Smith (the father's second wife). She feels Robbie is given more
in all ways from his father now because of the tension of not knowing if Robbie
will get to stay with him. Robbie knows this and is able to manipulate both his
father and his mother with the circumstances.
261 S.C. at 86, 198 S.E.2d at 274.
30. 260 S.C. 418, 196 S.E.2d 496 (1973).
31. The injunction ordered that:
[Tihe defendants shall be permitted to call Geddes Charles Boyter, III by
telephone at 2:00 p.m. on each Sunday, and they shall be permitted to talk to
Geddes Charles Boyter, III for a period of time not to exceed thirty (30) minutes.
It is further ordered that the defendants are enjoined and restrained from tele-
phoning the Plaintiffs or Geddes Charles Boyter, IMI at any time other than that
time herein prescribed and that the defendants shall not otherwise interfere
with, molest, or bother the Plaintiffs or Geddes Charles Boyter, M.
Record at 12.
32. 260 S.C. at 421, 196 S.E.2d at 498.
33. Record, Appendix at 3-4.
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commanded nothing of the stepfather, the court stated: "One
may not be convicted of contempt for violating a court order
which fails to tell him in definite terms what he must do. The
language of the commands must be clear and certain rather than
implied."'34
Although the supreme court did not discuss whether the
grandparents had a right to visit their grandson, this issue war-
rants further comment. Welchel is illustrative of the situation
which often arises when the parents of a deceased father or
mother wish to establish visitation rights with their grandchild.
In this case, the child's father was deceased, and after the remar-
riage of the mother, considerable discord developed between the
paternal grandparents and the child's mother and stepfather. In
1971, the grandparents had instituted a proceeding to establish
rights of visitation with their grandson. The Family Court of
Spartanburg denied their petition, holding that "the grandpar-
ents had no right of visitation against the wishes of the mother
having custody of the child."35 As in custody proceedings, the
primary consideration in determining visitation rights is the wel-
fare of the child. 6 It must be noted that even between a natural
father and mother who have equal rights, duties and powers con-
cerning the custody of their child, neither is provided a legal right
to visitation.37 The privilege of visitation must "yield to the good
of the child and may be denied or limited where the best interests
of the child will be served thereby.""8 Applying this rule to the
situation at hand, it similarly follows that, while the court may
grant the privilege if it is in the child's best interest, grandparents
have no absolute right to visitation. 9
34. 260 S.C. at 421, 196 S.E.2d at 498.
35. Id. at 420, 196 S.E.2d at 497.
36. Grimsley v. Grimsley, 250 S.C. 389, 393, 158 S.E.2d 197, 199 (1967). The determi-
nation of visitation rights is generally one addressed to the trial court's broad discretion
and, absent a finding of clear abuse of such discretion, will not be denied, granted, or
modified. See Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 340, 143 S.E.2d 619, 623 (1963).
Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the view that when a parent is awarded custody
of the child, a grandparent cannot obtain an order allowing him to take the child to his
own home or elsewhere for even limited periods of time. However, the court may order
the parent to allow the grandparent to visit the child in the home of the custodian at
specified times. On the other hand, other courts have held that grandparents may be given
visitation rights if a sufficient showing is made that the welfare of the child requires or
will not be adversely affected by it. 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 864 (1966).
37. See Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 340, 143 S.E.2d 619, 624 (1963).
38. Id.
39. In Douglass v. Merriman, 163 S.C. 210, 161 S.E. 452 (1931), the father instituted
1974]
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C. Disputes Between Parents and Third Persons
Suits involving third persons often arise when a parent leaves
a child with a friend or relative who later refuses to return the
child when requested to do so." Generally such disputes are re-
solved by applying the traditional principle requiring custody to
be awarded with regard to the best interests of the child. How-
ever, in McCormick v. McMurray,' the supreme court was faced
with the limited statutory question of whether the child had been
voluntarily abandoned; an affirmative decision would have
barred the parental rights of the mother forever
4 2
The Family Court Judge determined that the child had not
been voluntarily abandoned and ordered immediate custody to
the mother. The record revealed that the mother had been in a
difficult financial situation at the time she left the child with the
foster parents and that the adverse circumstances had continued
until the time of the proceeding. Although the foster parents con-
ceded that they knew of the mother's destitute situation, they
contended "that her conduct during the subsequent twelve
month period evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish all paren-
a proceeding to obtain custody of his four year old child, who had since birth lived with
his maternal grandparents. Although granting custody of the child to the widowed father
who had recently remarried, the supreme court expressly provided visitation rights to the
grandparents who had supported and cared for the child.
Although the grandparents in Welchel v. Boyter, 260 S.C. 418, 196 S.E.2d 496 (1973),
had never continuously cared for the child, the mother conceded that she had lived with
them while her husband was in the service and was living with them at the time the child
was born. Furthermore, the record revealed that the mother and child had continued to
live with the grandparents until the child was a year old and, thereafter, had visited in
their home several times a week until the child was three years old. Record at 15.
40. H. CLARK, supra note 19, § 17.5.
41. 260 S.C. 452, 196 S.E.2d 642 (1973).
42. The petitioners, who had been given custody of the five year old child by the
mother, instituted this action under S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-51.1 et seq. (1962), seeking an
order terminating the mother's parental rights and granting exclusive custody to them.
Section 31-51.4 provides:
If the court, after this hearing, finds that the child has been voluntarily aban-
doned for a period in excess of twelve months, it may issue an order forever
barring parental or guardianship rights as to such minor child and may award
custody of the child as it deems proper, and such child shall be eligible for
adoption.
Sections 31-51.1 to .5 have been repealed and replaced by §§ 31-60 to 65 which
became effective July 14, 1972. The present statute shortens the period necessary to
constitute "abandonment" to six months. It further explicitly defines the circumstances
under which a court is to find that a child has been "abandoned." S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-
60 to 65 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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tal claims to the child."43 Since giving custody to the petitioners,
the mother had only visited the child twice and had written let-
ters to the foster parents indicating a willingness to permit their
adoption of the child.4 The supreme court found, however, that
the record amply supported the trial judge's findings that the
mother's actions were prompted by the same financial difficulties
which had originally motivated the mother to leave the child. The
court, quoting from an earlier decision, emphasized that a finding
of voluntary abandonment must include evidence of conduct "on
the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego
all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.
It does not include an act or course of conduct which is done
through force of circumstances or from dire necessity."4 The
court affirmed the lower court's decision on the issue of voluntary
abandonment, finding that the mother never intended to
abandon her child and that she originally left the child with peti-
tioners because of her financial difficulties. The order granting
immediate custody of the child to the mother was, however, re-
versed. The court found that the trial judge had, in part, based
his decision on the clearly erroneous conclusion of law that as
between the two parties the natural mother was automatically
entitled to immediate custody. Again referring to the elementary
rule that the best interests of the child is the controlling factor,
the court remanded for further hearings on this issue.
II. ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
A. Alimony
Although the authority to grant alimony is provided in nearly
every state by statute,4" "a wife is never entitled to alimony as a
matter of course."47 The allowance of alimony is a matter within
the discretion which the trial judge exercises with reference to all
the circumstances of each particular case." The South Carolina
Divorce Act authorizes the court in every judgment of divorce to
provide maintenance support and alimony as may be fit, equita-
43. 260 S.C. at 455, 196 S.E.2d at 644.
44. Brief for Appellant at 45.
45. 260 S.C. at 455, 196 S.E.2d at 643, quoting Bevis v. Bevis, 254 S.C. 345, 351, 175
S.E.2d 398, 400 (1970) (citations omitted).
46. H. CLARK, supra note 19, § 14.1. See also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-112 to 113 (1962).
47. Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 224, 133 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1963), quoting 17
Am. JUR. Divorce and Separation § 672 (1957).
48. Long v. Long, 247 S.C. 250, 252, 146 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1965).
1974]
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ble and just according to the circumstances of the parties and the
nature of the case.49
In Spence v. Spence, 0 the wife appealed the lower court's
order denying an award of alimony. Stipulating that the wife was
at liberty to petition the court if a change of conditions occurred,
the Family Court Judge found that the wife had sufficient wealth
and income and that the husband, who had custody of the chil-
dren, was presently unable to afford alimony. Construing the
order as entitling the wife to alimony, the supreme court reviewed
only the question of whether the financial circumstances of the
parties should relieve the husband of immediate alimony pay-
ments. Upon examining the record, the supreme court reversed
the lower court's decision, stating that the trial judge had "failed
to properly determine the equities of the case."5 The evidence
clearly supported a finding that the wife had been accustomed to
a higher standard of living during the marriage than she could
maintain subsequent to the divorce.2 Further, the court was of
the opinion that the trial judge had improperly considered the
terms of the property settlement in his denial of alimony. Prior
to their separation, the husband and wife owned as tenants in
common a home valued at $160,000. Instead of selling the home
in partition, the wife agreed to receive $50,000 for her interest and
thus enable the husband to retain the home for himself and the
children. In determining the question of alimony, the lower court
placed great weight on the fact that in partitioning the jointly
owned property, the husband was required to finance the pay-
ment to the wife and thereby incur additional expenses. The su-
preme court stated that this factor should not weigh against the
wife on the question of alimony because the husband had volun-
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-113 (1962).
Circumstances which a trial judge should consider are the needs of the wife and the
child in relation to the husband's ability to provide for those needs. Further, the wife's
health, age, general condition, income and earning capacities are important factors. It is
also pertinent to consider the necessities and living expenses of the husband. In weighing
each of these considerations, the court's allowance of alimony should not be excessive but
should be fair and just to all parties concerned. Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 171
S.E.2d 704 (1970). See Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965); Murdock v.
Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E.2d 323 (1963).
50. 260 S.C. 526, 197 S.E.2d 683 (1973).
51. Id. at 530, 197 S.E.2d at 685.
52. The supreme court found that the wife occupied a rented apartment and earned
$8,000 per year as a teacher. Further, the court stated that she "has the advantage of
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tarily chosen to buy the wife's half and assume the additional
debt. Holding that the trial judge had abused his discretion, the
court remanded for a determination of the proper amount of ali-
mony.
Although the trial court in Herbert v. Herbert13 granted the
husband a divorce a vinculo matrimonii due to his wife's habitual
drunkenness, the court found that the wife's conduct did not bar
her claim to alimony. To the contrary, the court considered her
alcoholic addiction as a factor to be weighed in determining the
amount of alimony. The husband based his argument primarily
on the well-established rule that the wife is precluded from main-
taining a proceeding for separate maintenance "if she is chargea-
ble with substantial fault or misconduct, either by way of act or
omission, which materially contributed to the disruption of the
marital relation . . . . I The trial judge found that the wife's
conduct had been a contributing factor to the couple's marital
difficulties, but that it "should not be used as a basis for deter-
mining real moral wrongdoing or fault."5 Agreeing with the lower
court's conclusion, the supreme court determined that chronic
alcoholism is not to be equated with misconduct, but is better
understood as a disease. 6 The court, affirming the allowance of
alimony, emphasized that only the adulterous wife is absolutely
barred from alimony and that, in all other cases the matter is
within the discretion of the trial judge. 7
In Smith v. Smith," the elderly plaintiff appealed from the
lower court's decision refusing to grant him a divorce on the
grounds of desertion and ordering him to begin monthly pay-
ments toward his wife's support. 9 The supreme court labelled the
53. 260 S.C. 86, 194 S.E.2d 238 (1973).
54. Miller v. Miller, 225 S.C. 274, 280, 82 S.E.2d 119, 122 (1934), quoting 3 NELSON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 32.31 (2d ed. 1945).
55. 260 S.C. at 89, 194 S.E.2d at 238.
56. 260 S.C. at 91, 194 S.E.2d at 240, citing DeSipio v. DeSipio, 186 A.2d 624 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1962).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-113 (1962) provides:
In every judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony in a suit by the
wife the court shall make such orders touching the maintenance, alimony and
suit money of the wife or any allowance to be made to her and, if any, the
security, to be given for the same, as from the circumstances of the parties and
nature of the case may be fit, equitable and just. But no alimony shall be
granted to an adulterous wife.
See also Kendall v. Kendall, 260 S.C. 570, 197 S.E.2d 689 (1973) (desertion); Page v.
Page, 260 S.C. 298, 195 S.E.2d 613 (1973) (desertion).
58. 260 S.C. 65, 194 S.E.2d 199 (1973).
59. Id. at 66, 194 S.E.2d at 201.
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trial court's order "woefully inadequate" for failing to make ex-
press findings as to whether the wife was justified in leaving her
husband,'" but it nevertheless, affirmed the trial judge's determi-
nation on that issue.' During the trial the wife charged her hus-
band with abusive treatment and with making continuous threats
against her life. The court stated that if the wife's testimony was
credible, her leaving the marital abode was justified and thus did
not constitute desertion.2
In his second exception, the husband contended that the
lower court erred in compelling support and maintenance pay-
ments when a divorce had not been granted to either party. It is
well established, however, that the causes for which separate
maintenance and support may be granted are not restricted to
those which constitute grounds for divorce. 3 A court is authorized
to decree maintenance support although a divorce is denied. 4 The
court found that the husband received a pension from the Veter-
ans Administration and additional income from two rental
houses. '5 Although his health was not perfect, the record indi-
cated that he was in better physical condition than his younger
wife. Thus upon reviewing the relative circumstances of the par-
ties and concluding that the wife was justified in living apart from
her husband, the court affirmed the order awarding the payment
of alimony.6
B. Child Support
The duty of parents to support and maintain their children
exists by statute or common law in every American jurisdiction.
7
The statutes of the various states authorize the courts to enter
orders for child support during the pendency of divorce actions,
60. Id.
61. Id. at 67, 194 S.E.2d at 201.
62. Id. The elements of a finding of desertion are set forth in Machado v. Machado,
220 S.C. 90, 100, 66 S.E.2d 629, 633 (1951), quoting 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
§ 4.02 (2d ed. 1945), which lists the essential elements as:
(1) cessation from cohabitation, (2) intent on the part of the absenting party not
to resume it, (3) absence of the opposite party's consent, and (4) absence of
justification.
63. Mincey v. Mincey, 224 S.C. 520, 531, 80 S.E.2d 123, 129 (1954); Machado v.
Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 103, 66 S.E.2d 629, 635 (1951).
64. Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. at 103, 66 S.E.2d at 635.
65. 260 S.C. at 67, 194 S.E.2d at 200.
66. Id.
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as well as orders which continue after the divorce is final. 8 As in
the case of child custody, child support orders are modifiable if a
change of condition occurs subsequent to the issuance of the origi-
nal decree. 9
Grout v. Alexander'0 concerned whether the father had de-
faulted in making child support payments as required by the
divorce decree.7 1 In addition the supreme court considered
whether a change in the mental health of the son justified increas-
ing the father's support payments. After reviewing the testimony
and exhibits, the Family Court Judge found that the father "had
made a conscientous effort to care for the minor child.""2 The
record reflected that the father had expended large sums of
money for medical and hospital bills.13 Apparently, because of
this fact and the father's modest income, the lower court was
willing to ignore his failure to meet the weekly support payments
required by the divorce decree. However, the supreme court found
that the trial judge's decision was "error plain on the record."74
The court pointed out that the payment of the additional expend-
itures did not excuse his failure to make the weekly support pay-
ments .15.
Although the couple's child had been of sound mind at the
time of the divorce, he had subsequently become mentally ill. 6
Due to the attendant financial, mental and physical burdens
placed upon the mother, she petitioned the court to increase the
amount of child support. The trial judge dismissed the request,
finding the evidence insufficient to warrant additional payments.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 15.2.
70. 260 S.C. 655, 197 S.E.2d 826 (1973).
71. The divorce decree ordered in part:
3. That the custody of the minor child sixteen years of age is equally placed
with both parents with the child having the reasonable right to determine the
amount of time spent with either parent.
4. It is further provided that while the child is living with the plaintiff the
husband shall pay the sum of Twenty ($20.00) Dollars per week to the plaintiff
for the child's maintenance with the question of maintenance remaining open
without prejudice for further Order of this Court and in addition thereto, the
defendant shall discharge all necessary medical, educational, and dental expen-
ses.
Record at 7.
72. Record at 9.
73. Record at 12-13.
74. 260 S.C. at 658, 197 S.E.2d at 827.
75. Id. at 659, 197 S.E.2d at 827.
76. Record at 8-9 (The nature of the subsequent illness is described).
1974]
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol26/iss2/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The supreme court determined that the evidence provided a
"clear inference . . .that change of conditions of the utmost
gravity and significance had occurred." 7 Because of the inade-
quacy of the trial record, however, the court refused to exercise
its equity jurisdiction and merely directed a new trial.78
III. REVIEW
In the various proceedings involving domestic relations, the
broad discretion of the trial judge is seldom questioned. For the
most part, the supreme court has followed the general rule that
the trial judge's findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it appears that they are without evidentiary support or against
the clear preponderance of the evidence.7" Recently, however, the
court refused to decide two cases because the trial court's findings
were so indefinite and the record so inadequate that there was no
proper basis for appellate review.8 1 In the past term, the court
frequently commented on the inadequacy of the findings of the
trial judge. In Sutcliffe v. Sutcliffe,"' a child custody proceeding,
the supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the Court
of Common Pleas of Orangeburg County. The trial judge con-
cluded that the wife was guilty of misconduct which justified the
physical abuse by her husband and disqualified her from obtain-
ing custody of the children.8 2 However, on appeal, the supreme
court found that there had been no "factual finding. . . as to just
what the 'misconduct' on the part of the wife" was. 3 Addition-
ally, the court stated:
Even if the testimony of the wife and her witnesses be entirely
discounted, the testimony of the husband would prove no immo-
ral conduct on the part of the wife, and at the most prove noth-
ing more than an impropriety or indiscretion on [sic] part suffi-
cient to give rise to some suspicion unless satisfactorily ex-
plained. Such would neither justify the conduct of the husband
77. 260 S.C. at 659, 197 S.E.2d at 828.
78. Id.
79. See Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 339, 143 S.E.2d 619, 623 (1965); Frazier v.
Frazier, 228 S.C. 149, 165, 89 S.E.2d 225, 233-4 (1955).
80. Sayler v. Parler, 258 S.C. 514, 189 S.E.2d 294 (1972); Shecut v. Shecut, 257 S.C.
354, 185 S.E.2d 895 (1971). In each of these cases, the supreme court found that the Family
Court of Orangeburg County had failed to properly consider the issues involved and
remanded for new trial.
81. 260 S.C. 198, 195 S.E.2d 113 (1973).
82. Id. at 202-03, 195 S.E.2d at 115.
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nor disqualify her to have the custody of the children.84
The supreme court recognized that the trial judge not only made
clearly erroneous conclusions of fact but also failed to apply the
proper criteria in awarding custody.85 Therefore, on remand, the
court explicitly designated the issues to be heard and the perti-
nent factors to be considered in the custody proceeding."
MARGARET A. CHRISTIAN
84. Id.
85. The court's opinion stated:
Although the only issue herein is the custody of the children, for the most part
the record contains evidence tending to establish fault or lack of fault on the
part of the respective parties, with only a minimal amount of evidence bearing
on what is truly in the best interests of the children involved. While the lower
court concluded that the best interests of the children would be served by
awarding custody to the father, the decree did not set forth the salient facts upon
which it was based, as is required by Rule 13 of the Family Court Rules.
Id. at 202, 195 S.E.2d at 115.
86. Id. at 203, 195 S.E.2d at 115.
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